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Abstract 
How do scientific innovations spread within and across scientific communities? In this paper, 
we propose a general account of the diffusion of scientific innovations. This account 
acknowledges that novel ideas must be elaborated on and conceptually translated before they 
can be adopted and applied to field-specific problems. We motivate our account by 
examining an exemplary case of knowledge diffusion, namely, the early spread of theories of 
rational decision-making. These theories were grounded in a set of novel mathematical tools 
and concepts that originated in John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior (1944, 1947) and subsequently spread widely across the 
social and behavioral sciences. Introducing a network-based diffusion measure, we trace the 
spread of those tools and concepts into distinct research areas. We furthermore present an 
analytically tractable typology for classifying publications according to their roles in the 
diffusion process. The proposed framework allows for a systematic examination of the 
conditions under which scientific innovations spread within and across both preexisting and 
newly emerging scientific communities. 
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1. Introduction 
The development and dissemination of new ideas lie at the heart of scientific inquiry, and 
drawing upon such novel ideas is a constitutive element of scholarly activity. Scientific 
innovations - be they new theories, models, methods, techniques, or concepts - can diffuse 
widely and systematically, over long periods of time, and across a broad range of contexts. 
Such diffusion processes, which can be understood as instances of knowledge transfer, have 
long been of interest in the history and philosophy of science (e.g., Ash 2006, 
Howlett/Morgan 2011, Kaiser 2004, Morgan 2014).2 But to date, philosophers and historians 
of science have rarely drawn on the literature from innovation studies to further analyze 
processes of knowledge diffusion in science, nor have they made extensive use of 
quantitative-empirical methods to systematically analyze how particular scientific 
innovations spread. 
In this paper, we address this gap in the literature by offering a novel account of the 
diffusion of knowledge in general and of scientific innovations in particular. We combine 
concepts and methods from contemporary innovation studies and empirical network analysis 
with a set of philosophical ideas derived from Thomas Kuhn’s study of the emergence of 
innovations in science. Innovation scholars have long argued that the diffusion of innovations 
takes place in networks of actors who engage with the innovation in virtue of the different 
roles they play in the networks of which they are a part (Coleman et al. 1966, Valente 1995, 
Rogers 2003). In developing this argument, they have generally taken the innovation itself to 
remain unchanged as it spreads from one adopter to the next. Although that premise may 
hold true for innovations in general, it does not hold true, we argue, for scientific innovations. 
As Kuhn notes, novel ideas in science must be elaborated upon and conceptually translated 
before scientists can adopt and apply them to field-specific problems (1977 [1959]). The 
                                                
2 See, e.g., the special issues on interdisciplinarity in Synthese (2013), Vol. 190, and on model transfer in 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2014), Vol. 48.  
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framework presented in this paper acknowledges this aspect as a precondition for the 
diffusion of scientific innovations, not only within but across preexisting and newly-forming 
fields. 
Our aim is to identify and further characterize the roles played by network actors by 
combining the insights of both bodies of literature - innovation studies and Kuhn - that have 
so far been worked out separately. Specifically, we take Kuhn’s idea of translation to be 
essential for the adoption of scientific innovations. We assume that this translation process is 
undertaken step-wise by scientists engaging in different ways with the scientific innovation 
in their written contributions. Those contributions actively promote the diffusion of a novel 
idea in virtue of different roles they play in the modification of the scientific innovation. In 
particular, we identify four different roles that scientific contributions (either published and 
unpublished) can play in extending upon and modifying the scientific innovation and thereby 
facilitating its spread: innovator, elaborator, translator, and specialist. Beyond the scientific 
innovation itself, contributions can take the role of elaborating on and experimenting with the 
innovation to better understand its potentials and limitations for their field. Contributions can 
then take the role of translating the innovation - often in its elaborated form - for new fields 
of enquiry. Translation aligns a scientific innovation with previous research traditions. It 
reveals the innovation’s potential for particular disciplinary problems and establishes the 
basis for its application in specialist research, the fourth role that contributions can occupy.   
Against this background, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we introduce a 
network-based diffusion measure that is empirically tractable and that allows researchers to 
reconstruct the extent to which a given scientific innovation has spread across preexisting and 
newly forming academic disciplines and fields. Specifically, we use co-citation analysis to 
identify topical overlaps among scholarly contributions that relate to the scientific innovation 
and were published in the years following its initial publication. The network of topical 
overlaps among these publications yields an empirical basis for measuring the spread of the 
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scientific innovation into different domains. Second, we present a rule-based typology for 
classifying academic contributions in terms of their roles in facilitating the diffusion of the 
innovation. More specifically, we identify publications whose content was related to, and that 
were published in the wake of, the initial innovation and we classify these publications 
according to their role in facilitating stepwise modifications of the scientific innovation. Our 
classification distinguishes between ‘innovator’-, ‘elaborator’-, ‘translator’-, and ‘specialist’-
roles, each of which have distinct parts in promoting the adoption and modification of the 
scientific innovation. We characterize those roles systematically in terms of salient positions 
in the co-citation network that represents the diffusion outcome. This typology allows us to 
formulate general conjectures about the conditions under which scientific innovations diffuse 
across research fields.  
We illustrate our approach by applying it to the well-documented case of axiomatic 
theories of rational decision-making, which originated in a set of highly innovative concepts 
and mathematical tools introduced by the mathematician John von Neumann and the 
economist Oskar Morgenstern in the mid-1940s. While these concepts and tools were 
initially considered to be too challenging mathematically by social scientists, they spread 
widely throughout the second half of the 20th century, both within and beyond the behavioral 
and social sciences. In this process, those innovative tools and concepts were extended, 
elaborated upon, sometimes transformed, and ultimately applied to a variety of problems 
across a wide range of fields. The application of our framework to the spread of rational 
choice theories (hereafter: RCTs) showcases its usefulness for addressing questions about 
knowledge diffusion within and across scientific communities more generally.  
2. Thomas Kuhn on Scientific Innovations 
While many core contributions to the philosophy of science have been concerned with 
questions of rational theory choice, scientific discovery, and progress in science, this 
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literature has largely sought to develop theories of scientific rationality and the formulation 
of demarcation criteria for scientific knowledge (Lakatos 1978, Popper 1963, 2002 [1935]). 
In so doing, this literature has generally neglected how scientists actually come to accept and 
adopt a scientific innovation, and has tended to focus on logical and epistemological or, more 
broadly, rational features of theory choice and scientific change.3 However, since Thomas 
Kuhn (1962), we know that non-rational factors can lead to the emergence of new paradigms 
and influence theory choice. While Kuhn is most well-known for his account of how science 
proceeds by way of alternations between normal science and scientific revolutions (Kuhn 
1962), he offered an important insight on this matter in a lecture entitled ‘The Essential 
Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research’ (Kuhn 1977 [1959]), which 
predated his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). In this lecture, which predated his 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Kuhn offers an important insight into how 
scientific innovations emerge and diffuse within and across scientific communities.   
According to Kuhn, before a scientific innovation can take hold, the innovator confronts 
an ‘essential tension’ that originates in the need to play the roles of both iconoclast and 
traditionalist (Kuhn 1977 [1959]). As the constitutive characteristic of a scientific innovation 
is novelty, that is, a breaking with established conventions, the originator of a scientific 
innovation must on the one hand be a divergent thinker who questions old ideas and 
formulates new ones. On the other hand, he or she must also be a convergent thinker who can 
align his or her new ideas with prior knowledge (Kuhn 1977 [1959], 139 f.). In the sense that 
a scientific innovation resembles a theory that belongs to a different paradigm, proponents of 
both competing theories can be compared with two native speakers of different languages. 
While the vocabulary of two theories can be identical and most words might function in the 
                                                
3 Lakatos’ criticized Popper’s demarcation criterion for science from non-science as being too restrictive and 
ruling out many examples from scientific practice. Kuhn, however, came one step closer towards considering 
also the social context to be essential in his account of scientific knowledge production, which fits with our 
empirical approach.   
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same way, some relevant words in the basic and theoretical vocabulary function very 
differently. Scientists discover the existence of such differences when they experience 
repeated communication breakdowns between one another. Therefore, the need to bridge the 
gap between a novel idea and the established framework is particularly pressing in the case of 
scientific innovations. If scientific innovations are not adapted to and aligned with existing 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks, they might not become widely adopted across 
different fields.  
Given Kuhn’s more general picture of the existence of incommensurable paradigms in 
science (Kuhn 1962), translation overcomes potential communication breakdowns between 
scientists who adhere to different paradigms (Kuhn 1977 [1973]: 338). This idea can also be 
applied to scientific innovations: Translating a scientific innovation into the language of a 
particular field or subfield dissolves the tension between novelty and tradition and thereby 
facilitates its adoption.4 Translation takes place by “treating already published papers as a 
Rosetta stone or, often more effective, by visiting the innovator, talking with him, watching 
him and his students at work” (Kuhn 1977 [1973]: 339), and then communicating this new 
piece of knowledge to specialist scientists in a language that they understand. This way, a 
scientific innovation is made valuable for field-specific purposes. As the original innovation 
is adapted, extended, or even transformed in the process of translation, the outcome may 
differ conceptually and/or methodologically from the original idea.  
Translation of a scientific innovation does not guarantee adoption, and as such is not a 
sufficient condition for successful diffusion. However, in the following, we draw on Kuhn’s 
insight that it is a necessary and thus integral precondition for the wide spread of scientific 
innovations. Before we outline our approach, we will introduce RCTs as one prominent 
                                                
4 In the following, we focus on scientific innovations because we take them to be the prime example of a piece 
of knowledge that undergoes such a translation process. Note, however, that already established theories can 
also require translation to apply them to new problems. 
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example of a scientific innovation that has spread extensively across the social and 
behavioral sciences. 
3. Theories of Rational Choice: An Example of a Scientific Innovation  
Today, theories of rational decision-making are used in various disciplines and 
encompass a large number of approaches to human behavior within but also beyond the 
social sciences, including for instance biology and philosophy. RCTs come in many guises, 
are conceptually distinct, and have been applied to fundamentally different problems 
(Herfeld 2014, Thomas 2015, esp. ch. 5). However, they share several constitutive 
ingredients. First, they hold that human action should be conceptualized as rational action. 
Second, they are often grounded in a formal-axiomatic representation of rational action in 
set-theoretic terms. Preferences of an agent are represented by a binary relation whose 
structure is constrained by a set of consistency requirements, such as the transitivity and 
completeness axioms, which ensure the rationality of an agent’s preferences. Those axioms 
furthermore allow for the deduction of such theorems as the principle of expected utility 
(Anand et al. 2009, Fishburn 1968). Examples of RCTs include game and decision theory, 
(subjective) expected utility theory, consumer choice theory in microeconomics, as well as 
approaches to conceptualizing human behavior in social choice theory, public choice theory, 
etc.  
A natural starting point for studying the diffusion of RCTs is the Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior (hereafter TGEB), published in 1944 by John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern. The novel contribution of the book is to formally represent human behavior by 
a set of formal-mathematical tools and concepts taken from mathematical logic, probability 
theory, axiomatic set theory, and topology (Boumans/Davis 2010, Debreu 1986, Isaac 
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2010).5 Prior to the publication of the TGEB, those tools were unknown or hardly familiar to 
social and behavioral scientists. As such, the tools were highly innovative. In economics, 
they would replace calculus techniques that had traditionally been used to represent human 
decision-making as an optimization problem. Among its many contributions, the TGEB, by 
drawing on those formal-mathematical tools, contained two innovative formulations of 
rational decision-making that would become extremely important: (1) an axiomatic 
representation of the long-standing principle of expected utility, and (2) the minimax theorem 
as a ‘rule’ for rational action in situations of strategic uncertainty, which von Neumann and 
Morgenstern modeled by introducing the concept of a two-person zero-sum game.6 Those 
concepts, together with the mathematical tools they were grounded in, would come to be 
adopted, elaborated upon, and modified, and would find extensive applications within and 
across the social and behavioral sciences.  
The reviews following its publication show that from the beginning, the TGEB was 
received by scholars from various disciplines, ranging from mathematics and mathematical 
statistics to economics, sociology, and philosophy (Leonard 2010). Yet, while scholars 
acknowledged the path-breaking achievement of the book, the tools and concepts contained 
therein were not taken up immediately (Giocoli 2003, Weintraub 1992). In part, this was due 
to their relative inaccessibility to social scientists without extensive mathematical training, 
particularly in mathematical logic and topology. The major contributions contained in the 
TGEB were due to von Neumann, who was strongly influenced by the formal-axiomatic 
program of David Hilbert (e.g., Giocoli 2003a, Weintraub 2002). For social scientists, 
                                                
5 RCTs had numerous intellectual precursors (e.g., Bernoulli 1954 [1738]), De Finetti 1937, Frisch 1971 [1926], 
Pareto 1972 [1927], Ramsey 1931), including previous contributions by von Neumann to the analysis of 
strategic games (Dimand/Dimand 1992). While it could be argued that these were the true innovators behind 
RCTs, the TGEB was the first contribution to fuse those ideas to formulate what became two accounts of 
rational behavior that would prove fruitful for the behavioral and social sciences.  
6 Note that von Neumann and Morgenstern did not intend the principle of expected utility as a decision theory. 
Its popularization as a decision theory was fostered only later by economists such as Jacob Marschak (e.g., 
Giocoli 2006).   
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including Morgenstern, the effort of becoming acquainted with this new kind of mathematics 
initially set a substantial barrier to adoption (Leonard 1995). Initially, the most innovative 
ideas contained in the TGEB were only accessible to mathematically versed scholars, who 
drew upon the TGEB as a useful “tool-box” (Giocoli 2003a), but beyond that small circle, 
scholars had serious difficulties with the work (e.g., Koopmans 1957: 171). Additional 
scientific contributions were needed that would make those new concepts and tools 
accessible and that would illustrate their relevance for field-specific applications.   
Once social scientists overcame those initial barriers, the mathematical tools and 
concepts contained in the TGEB were taken up across a remarkably diverse range of 
scholarly enquiry, including mathematics, mathematical statistics, measurement theory, and 
mathematical psychology, applied behavioral decision research, social choice theory and 
sociology, political science, organization theory, as well as biology and philosophy, among 
others.7 Moreover, by the 1970s they had laid the ground for entirely new subfields of 
enquiry, including public choice theory, mathematical finance, and operations research, 
including linear programming, as well as game and decision theory. Table 1 offers only a 
partial list of fields that have been directly influenced by the concepts and tools contained in 
the TGEB and that are commonly identified in the major historical accounts of those fields to 
which RCTs spread (see Amadae 2003, Debreu 1983, Dimand/Dimand 1992, Dimand 2000, 
Düppe/Weintraub 2014a, Erickson 2010, Erickson et al. 2013, Giocoli 2003 and 2012, 
Heukelom 2014 and 2010, Erickson 2015, Weintraub 2002). 
 
--- Table 1 here --- 
 
                                                
7 While it can be said that social choice traces back to Condorcet’s famous ‘jury theorem’, published by 
Marquis de Condorcet in 1785, modern social choice theory clearly has its roots in Kenneth Arrow’s Social 
Choice and Individual Values published in 1951 and was as such equally affected by RCTs.  
  10 
A full explanation of how the innovative mathematical tools and concepts contained in the 
TGEB spread to these different fields would require the identification of a complex set of 
interdependent factors that are furthermore particular to each field. As historical accounts 
have established, the unique context of the Cold War profoundly shaped the political, social, 
and scientific conditions under which the TGEB and its conceptual successors were adopted.8 
While we hint at these contextual factors, they are not generalizable to all processes of 
knowledge diffusion. Central to our analysis, instead, is the observation that the innovation 
could only spread to those fields by being modified in various ways that enabled their 
applications to problems in those fields in the first place. Our primary aim is to capture this 
dimension of the diffusion process more generally. We do that by systematically analyzing 
the role of particular contributions that proved crucial in the adoption of the tools and 
concepts in the TGEB. We look especially at the role those contributions played in engaging 
with and modifying those tools and concepts and thereby enabling their spread. As will 
become clear in subsequent sections, our analysis offers a bird’s-eye view of the outcome of 
the diffusion of the TGEB - one that is remarkably consistent with existing historical 
accounts and may thus be seen as a systematic way to trace diffusion processes that 
complements historical narratives.  
4. A Network Representation of the Diffusion of a Scientific Innovation 
Pioneering studies of the diffusion of innovations have investigated how innovations 
spread within networks of actual and potential adopters (Rogers 2003, Coleman et al. 1966, 
Strang/Tuma 1993, Valente 1995). We take up this idea insofar as we consider scientific 
innovations to spread through a network of loosely interrelated scholarly contributions that 
                                                
8 For an account of the history of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s contribution, see Leonard (2010). For 
accounts on the history of rational choice theories, see Amadae (2003), Düppe/Weintraub (2014b), Erickson et 
al. (2013), Giocoli (2003), Heukelom (2010, 2014), Isaac (2010), Thomas (2015), and Weintraub (1992, 2002), 
among others. 
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engage with, and extend upon, the innovation in question. Innovation studies generally 
conceptualize an innovation as a good whose essential properties remain unchanged in the 
process of its diffusion; yet this premise arguably does not hold for scientific innovations. As 
mentioned above, to resolve the essential tension between developing a new idea and 
grounding it in contemporary scientific tradition (Kuhn 1977 [1959]), early adopters have to 
adapt, extend, re-combine, and even transform the initial scientific innovation in order to 
align it with disciplinary standards and existing theoretical frameworks and concepts. An 
effective analysis of the diffusion of scientific innovations must therefore not only track the 
temporal dimension of the spread of the scientific innovation into different domains. It must 
also acknowledge the substantive dimension of modification in the diffusion process and 
capture how the innovation’s modification dynamically shapes and reconfigures the 
possibilities for its subsequent adoption and its extensive application beyond the problem for 
which it was invented.  
To account for both the temporal and the substantive dimensions of the diffusion process, 
we model the spread of a scientific innovation as the emergence of a network of loosely 
related scholarly contributions that relate to, engage with, and extend the scientific 
innovation. We represent the outcome of this process as a network of relevant contributions 
that are connected (a) to one another and (b) to the scientific innovation itself via topical 
overlaps. We label this the network representation of the “epistemic domain” of a scientific 
innovation. With methods from network analysis, we then identify and characterize different 
roles that scientific contributions can play in the diffusion process and classify them in terms 
of those roles by examining their salient positions in this network representation. The 
resulting typology captures the idea that a scientific innovation can be applied extensively 
beyond the problem for which it was invented only because it is adapted, extended, or 
modified by subsequent scholarly contributions that take up different roles in the diffusion 
process. 
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The underlying rationale of constructing our network is straightforward and builds on the 
basic principle that new research acknowledges relevant prior knowledge by way of citations. 
Citations (1) attribute contributions to a particular publication and (2) convince a scientific 
community of the validity and novelty of one’s own research (Gilbert 1977, Kaplan 1965). 
Our basic premise is that if a publication cites the innovative contribution, this reference 
acknowledges the innovation along with the other references that it cites. Those other 
references that are cited together with the innovative contribution signal an acknowledgement 
of potentially numerous additional literatures that were informed by the innovation and have 
in turn informed the publication. As such, whenever research repeatedly cites a particular 
scientific innovation together with specific other contributions, this indicates a basic - 
possibly latent - topical overlap between the innovation and those other contributions. For 
example, the fact that two publications are cited together with the TGEB in one and the same 
publication suggests that both may be related to the tools and concepts contained in the 
TGEB. By considering only co-citations that appear recurrently in contributions that also cite 
a particular scientific innovation (such as the TGEB), it is possible to establish the epistemic 
domain into which the innovation subsequently spread.9  
This approach is an application of co-citation analysis, a well-established bibliometric 
method for analyzing such conjoint references that has been used to capture and measure the 
similarity in content between fields of research at the level of journals and disciplines (Small 
1973, Small/Griffith 1974, McCain 1991, White/McCain 1998, Boyack et al., 2005). Co-
citation analysis builds on the assumption that two publications exhibit topical overlap if they 
are often cited together in subsequent publications. Thus, by identifying works that are 
frequently cited a) together and b) along with the work containing the scientific innovation, 
we capture the intuition that the innovation spreads between contributions.  
                                                
9 Because it is already published, the innovation itself cannot establish such connections.   
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In the following we apply our approach to the diffusion of RCTs. We identify relevant 
contributions published between 1944 and 1970 from present-day publications, that is, from 
publications that were published between 1984 and 2014 that cite the TGEB. There are four 
basic benefits to drawing on present-day publications. First, existing citation databases that 
we are aware of offer only an incomplete coverage of the period before the late 1980s, 
thereby effectively precluding a direct citation analysis. For example, coverage in both Web 
of Science and Scopus is limited for the period before the 1980s and surely inadequate for the 
period that is of interest to us, i.e. 1944-1970. Second, the nuanced developments 
accompanying the diffusion of scientific innovations are not captured in direct citations, i.e., 
of who cites whom. This can occur in contexts and times in which knowledge diffusion 
proceeds through working papers and other formats that are not systematically included in 
citation databases. Such nuances are thus not immediately reflected in publications. As will 
become more apparent in the following application, only a small number of observations are 
needed to ensure that a particular intellectual contribution will become part of the epistemic 
domain and will thereby be subject to subsequent analyses.  
Third, attempts to reconstruct diffusion processes from direct citations confront the 
challenge that citation practices differ both qualitatively and quantitatively across disciplines 
and in time, and that citations may be made in response to skewed incentive structures of 
academic publishing (Crespo et al. 2013, Garfield 1979, Wilhite/Fong 2012). By 
reconstructing the epistemic domain from the citations made by present-day authors who are 
writing many years after the fact, we effectively circumvent this problem. Finally, co-citation 
analysis ensures that connections between papers with topical overlap are established even if 
those connections are not made explicit in the papers themselves. For example, many papers 
published in the 1950s refer indirectly to “von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions” 
without citing the TGEB explicitly. To the extent that the scientific innovation is modified in 
the process of its diffusion, co-citation of two contributions and with the publication 
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containing the scientific innovation can also signal critical engagement and even rejection of 
an original innovation in order to justify a new formulation.10 Finally, even if direct citation 
data were available for the time period of our study, research has found that co-citation 
analysis generates markedly better representations of ongoing research frontiers than do 
direct citations (Boyack/Klavans 2010). 
5. Data Source and Collection  
Our analysis is based on citation data that we collected from all 3,677 journal articles, 
1,061 conference proceedings, and 167 book chapters that cite the TGEB according to 
Scopus, an online database for academic literature as of September 2014. As coverage in 
Scopus only goes back to the 1980s, the earliest publications in our database were published 
in 1984 and the most recent ones were published in 2014.11  
As most of the 4,905 publications were written by more than one individual, the dataset 
contains contributions by 7,818 individuals, 1,700 of whom were (co-)authors of more than 
one publication. The 3,677 articles were published in 1,551 journals covering a broad range 
of disciplines, including economics, sociology, psychology, computational science, and 
mathematics, among many others. We extracted all references contained in the bibliographies 
of each of the 4,905 publications that cite the TGEB according to Scopus. This yielded 
193,685 citations in total (39.5 on average), ranging from references to Aristotle’s Politics to 
present-day publications such as Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow of 2011 along 
with the TGEB. Table 2 lists the number of contributions from which bibliographic data has 
                                                
10 One example is Kenneth Arrow’s adoption of Tarskian logic to formulate his choice theory, which he 
justified in reference to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiomatic representation of behavior but which was 
conceptually different von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory in crucial respects (Arrow 1951, ch. 2). 
11 Scopus was chosen because it includes citation data on selected monographs, including the TGEB. We 
accessed the database on July 23, 2014, and downloaded the bibliographic data on all 4,905 publications that 
cited TGEB as of that date. As the criteria for inclusion in the Scopus database are restrictive, Scopus contains 
about a fifth of the citations to TGEB found on Google Scholar. However, as our analysis is based on co-
occurrences of citations in publications, we do not need the comprehensive set of all publications citing TGEB - 
a large and representative sample of publications suffices (and is contained in our dataset). 
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been collected by period. The first period contains only fifteen articles, the first of which was 
published in 1984.  
 
--- Table 2 here --- 
 
As Scopus provides bibliographic information in free-text format, the data had to be pre-
processed manually. Given our ulterior interest in the early spread of the TGEB following its 
initial publication, we limited our analysis to references of contributions that were originally 
published between 1944 and 1970.12 We manually linked each recorded reference to a unique 
identifier and thereby ensured that different editions of the same text, as well as spelling 
variants, were aggregated to a single scientific contribution.13 We thereby identified 1,967 
unique texts that had been published in the period 1944-1970 and were cited 27,414 times in 
our 4,905 present-day publications, including 4,905 citations to the TGEB. This is the 
empirical basis for the following analyses. 
6. Representing the Epistemic Domain of Rational Choice Theories 
 Our aim is to construct a network representation of the epistemic domain into which 
RCTs spread in the 25 years following the publication of the TGEB in 1944. In this network, 
a publication that was originally written between 1944 and 1970 is called a node. An inferred 
topical overlap between two or more publications connected because they have been co-cited 
is called an edge (or tie). These relationships between nodes and edges capture the structure 
of the epistemic domain. We have chosen the period between 1944 and 1970 because by the 
                                                
12 As most present-day publications cite work that was published after the period of interest, this eliminated 
166,271 citations. While we cannot rule out the possibility of missing some observations due to transposed 
digits in the year of publication, exploratory analysis of the data indicates that this is not the case. Therefore, we 
do not expect a systematic bias to our findings. 
13 A workflow that is generalizable across research settings can be made available upon request. 
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early 1970s, the process of diffusion of RCTs was largely complete insofar as they had 
reached all of the fields and were subsequently applied in day-to-day research.   
One complication arising for our analysis is that the bibliometric data available is taken 
from contributions that were published many years after the period that is of interest to us (cf. 
Table 1) and relates to our aim of using this data to examine the period following the initial 
publication of the scientific innovation. The absolute frequency of co-citations in our data is a 
function not (only) of how important a contribution became shortly after it was made, but 
also on how many citations it received in publications that were published after 1980. We 
must define criteria by which to identify and remove connections that are due to the data 
compilation strategy rather than any intrinsic feature of the diffusion process. We define 
these criteria with three aspects in mind: first, we must compensate for the fact that the co-
citation data is taken from publications that were written many years after the fact; second, 
we must eliminate spurious connections; and third, the final network topology should be 
broadly interpretable in light of existing historical accounts of the spread of the TGEB. These 
criteria are met by a simple two-step procedure that consists of a) imposing a minimal 
threshold on the number of co-citations, and b) limiting the maximal number of years that 
two co-cited publications can be apart for a meaningful topical overlap to be in place. Given 
the novelty of our approach, we present and discuss each step in greater detail and illustrate 
the effects of each manipulation on the network in Figure 1.  
First, we eliminated very weak connections by imposing a minimal threshold on how 
often two publications must be cited together for a tie to connect the nodes representing 
them. Without such a threshold, the mere fact that any one of the 4,905 publications in our 
database cited two publications would result in their being inextricably connected. For 
example, both Jean Piaget’s 1969 classic The Psychology of the Child (Piaget/Inhelder 1969) 
and Max Planck’s Scientific Autobiography of 1968 would become part of the epistemic 
domain of TGEB and would be connected to each other merely because they were both cited 
  17 
in a publication in 2005 that also cited the TGEB, discussing scientific revolutions from the 
vantage point of chaos theory.14 Both publications arguably have little bearing on the TGEB 
and should therefore not become part of its epistemic domain. At the same time, imposing 
too high a threshold would eliminate smaller subfields of enquiry into which the TGEB 
spread. For example, setting a threshold higher than four would result in the elimination of 
Raiffa and Schlaifer’s seminal Applied Statistical Decision Theory from the epistemic 
domain, a core contribution that established the foundations for applied Bayesian analysis at 
the intersection of game theory and statistical decision theory (Keeney 2016).15  
We find that a threshold of three or more co-citations best balances the requirements of 
eliminating spurious connections while keeping small yet crucial subfields of enquiry in the 
network.16 A threshold of three co-citations eliminates 24,278 edges as spurious, such as the 
example of Piaget and Planck given above. After removing isolates, i.e., nodes which are not 
connected to any other nodes by at least three co-citations, this reduces the size of our 
network from 1,967 to 936 nodes and the number of edges from 27,414 to 3,136.17 The 
resultant network is depicted in Panel a of Figure 1. By definition, each contribution is 
connected to the TGEB, identified as the enlarged node at the center of the network. To 
reconstruct the epistemic domain into which the TGEB spread, we remove the TGEB from 
the network, allowing us to focus on the 2,201 connections among the remaining 
publications. After removing isolate nodes, this leaves all contributions made between 1944 
and 1970 that are cited in present-day articles that cite the TGEB, and the topical overlaps 
among them (see Figure 1, Panel b). 
 
                                                
14 The authors cite Planck’s text as an illustration of scientists’ (in)ability to accommodate changes in their 
cognitive schemas (Perla/Carifio 2005, 4). 
15 In a personal reconstruction of early influences, Raiffa himself acknowledged the importance of TGEB in 
motivating his own work that would combine game theory with statistical decision theory (Raiffa 2002). 
16 We have calculated all variables for a variety of thresholds (cf. the robustness checks in footnote 29). 
17 By this criterion, any two publications must be cited together in three of 4,905 contributions, including lesser-
known discussion papers (e.g., Hurwicz 1951) and dissertations (e.g., Leiserson 1966). 
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--- Figure 1 here --- 
 
Panel c of Figure 1 presents the same co-citation network as Panel b, but with an updated 
layout. It reveals an important implication of the fact that our data stems from publications 
that were written many years after the period that is of interest to us: with the benefit of 
hindsight, authors writing today can establish connections among any and all publications 
that were written in the years following the initial publication of the scientific innovation. As 
it stands, this obscures a crucial temporal aspect of the spread of scientific innovations, 
namely, that publications should be connected not merely because they are cited together 
today, but because they addressed overlapping topics in a similar stage in the diffusion 
process and thereby directly or indirectly informed one another. For example, although 50 
present-day publications in our database cite Pratt’s article Risk Aversion in the Small and 
Large of 1964 together with Nash’s classic article The Bargaining Problem of 1950, we 
would contend that this high number of co-citations is primarily due to the strong 
engagement of present-day authors with either of the two works rather than their inherent 
topical overlap. In other words, focusing on high co-citation rates alone obscures the vast 
differences in intellectual context in which both authors’ respective engagement with the 
scientific innovation took place.  
To address this matter, we limit the maximal number of years that any two publications 
can be apart for an identified topical overlap between them to be meaningful in terms of the 
diffusion process. In our case, we remove all edges between contributions that were 
published more than five years apart. While this implies that a paper published in 1951 
cannot be connected directly to a paper published in 1957, even if both are cited together 
three or more times in present-day publications, they may still be connected through indirect 
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links.18 We take this to capture a reasonable assumption about progress in science, namely, 
that an active field of research brings forth at least one significant contribution within at most 
five years.19  
Eliminating all edges between publications that were either co-cited fewer than three times 
or were published more than five years apart and removing isolates leaves 442 publications 
connected by 971 edges (panel d of Figure 1).20 The following analysis is of this network, 
which we take to be an adequate representation of the epistemic domain into which the 
scientific innovations contained in the TGEB spread in the 25 years following its publication. 
7. Analyzing the Epistemic Domain of Rational Choice Theories 
The network representation of the epistemic domain of RCTs reflects the outcome of 
intellectual engagement with the mathematical tools and concepts contained in the TGEB 
between 1944 and 1970 as we have inferred it from co-citation patterns in present-day 
publications.21 We propose that a careful analysis of the topology of this network can 
                                                
18 In the aforementioned example, Nash’s classic The Bargaining Problem of 1951, in which he cast classical 
problems of bilateral exchange in terms of non-zero-sum two-person games, is connected to his 1953 article on 
two-person cooperative games, in which he extends the bargaining problem to cases in which the involved 
parties can enforce agreed-upon plans of (rational) action (Nash 1953). In turn, this paper is connected to Luce 
and Raiffa’s well-known textbook Games and Decisions (1957) in which an entire chapter is devoted to Nash’s 
work (chapter 6). Luce and Raiffa’s textbook is in turn connected to Daniel Ellsberg’s classic Risk, Ambiguity 
and the Savage Axioms (1961), in which Ellsberg rejects the use of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions 
when ambiguity precludes the assignment of meaningful probabilities to outcomes, and which, finally, is 
connected to Pratt’s (1964) article that presents an economist’s measure of risk aversion which builds on the 
curvature of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.  
19 The requirement of ‘significance’ is that three or more present-day publications cite a publication together 
with one other publication of that field. Furthermore, as co-citations are taken from publications that have been 
written many years after the period of interest, this identifies topical overlaps that may not have been recognized 
at the time. With the benefit of hindsight, our network representation of the epistemic domain includes so-called 
‘sleeping beauty’ publications, i.e., contributions whose significance only becomes apparent years after their 
publication. One example is Ellsberg (1961), which has been identified as one of the 30 most prominent 
‘sleeping beauty’ publications of the social sciences and humanities (Qing et al. 2015), and is assigned a 
prominent role by our approach. 
20 While grounded in substantive deliberation, these thresholds could always be chosen differently. Less 
restrictive thresholds might identify even more fine-grained niches into which the TGEB spread, but (due to the 
source of our data) would come at the expense of overemphasizing the importance of fields that are of relevance 
to authors writing today. As a robustness check, we calculated all network variables for a variety of thresholds 
and compared their stability across specifications. We report on these checks in footnote 29. 
21 This network representation is ultimately of course an empirical artifact and as such does not and cannot 
capture intellectual engagement with the TGEB in its entirety. For example, ‘mathematical game theory’ seems 
curiously underrepresented in our network. This may be because of an underrepresentation of relevant 
publication outlets for mathematical game theorists in the Scopus database, or it may be because contributions 
  20 
improve our understanding of the factors that contributed to the spread of RCTs. More 
specifically, network analysis allows us to identify particular publications that played salient 
roles in diffusing RCTs by engaging with and modifying them for field-specific purposes. 
Our aim in the following is to identify such publications analytically from their positions in 
the co-citation network and to assess the roles they had in the early diffusion of RCTs. Our 
analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we identify what we call the ‘epistemic core’ of RCTs 
as that set of contributions that are most closely connected with one other. Second, we 
establish the multiple sub-domains into which RCTs would come to spread as clusters in the 
periphery of the epistemic domain as per 1970. And third, we classify individual 
contributions contained in the epistemic domain in terms of different roles they had in 
facilitating the spread of the innovation. Our focus on particular clusters as well as on 
specific publications and the roles they played showcases the complementarity of our 
empirical approach to existing historical accounts.  
The Epistemic Core of the Network 
With the network representation of the epistemic domain established, the first step is to 
identify publications that elaborated upon the concepts and tools contained in the TGEB. By 
engaging directly with RCTs, these publications form the backbone of the epistemic domain. 
In their attempt to develop the scientific innovation further and make it useful, such early 
adopter publications will be cited broadly across existing specializations in the present-day 
literature and will therefore exhibit a high level of interconnectedness within the co-citation 
network. We identify the set of contributions belonging to the epistemic core, i.e., the subset 
of densely interconnected publications, as the ‘epistemic core’ of the scientific innovation. 
We thereby proceed by using a recursive graph-partitioning algorithm known as k-shell 
                                                
made to this field after 1980 do not commonly cite the TGEB anymore and therefore do not show up in our 
database. While regrettable, we see no reason that this omission has a substantial impact on the composition and 
topology of the epistemic domain our approach has identified. 
  21 
decomposition.22 This algorithm groups the nodes of a network based on the number of 
connections they share with the other members of their respective shell. The more embedded 
a contribution is in the epistemic domain, the greater its number of connections to other 
highly-connected publications, and the higher its shell value will be. We define the epistemic 
core of the network as those publications that are part of the highest k-shell, in this case, the 
29 publications that are connected to at least seven other publications in the epistemic core.  
 
--- Figure 2 here --- 
 
The epistemic core is depicted in the inset of Figure 2. In our example, it includes seminal 
contributions by Kenneth Arrow, Milton Friedman, Herbert Simon, John Nash, Harry 
Markowitz, Duncan Luce, and Abraham Wald, and others. From the start, these authors 
attempted to establish the potential of, and further develop, the tools and concepts contained 
in the TGEB and to make them fruitful for problems in their respective fields of interest. 
Most of them were less concerned with traditional disciplinary boundaries and established 
practices and frameworks. Their work crossed the borders of traditional fields of research, 
was interdisciplinary, and would come to have a profound impact on disciplines as diverse as 
economics, psychology, organization theory, statistics, mathematics, and finance. Frequently 
it even reshaped the theoretical foundations of specific fields (e.g., Arrow in social choice 
theory) and motivated fundamentally new research areas (e.g., Markowitz in mathematical 
finance). To better understand which publications were particularly important in fostering the 
spread of RCTs into the specialized research areas identified from historical accounts (recall 
                                                
22 K-shell decomposition has been successfully applied to identify network positions that are important for 
diffusion processes in general (Kempe et al. 2003, Kitsak et al. 2010). Technically, it involves identifying the 
maximal subgraph in which each node shares at least k connections with other nodes in the subgraph, or shell 
(Batagelj/Zaversnik 2011). For our analyses, we drew upon implementations in the igraph-package of the 
statistical programming framework R (Csardi/Nepusz 2006).  
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Table 1), it is instructive to consider how each publication relates to those fields. In a next 
step, we therefore analyze our network topology for salient positions in the network that 
indicate particular roles played by individual publications in the early stages of diffusion. 
Before we can assign such roles, however, we must first identify the different research areas 
into which the tools and concepts contained in the TGEB would finally spread. 
Specialized Research Areas as Clusters of Contributions 
The division of cognitive labor in knowledge production leads us to expect that successful 
scientific innovations spread into and across multiple research areas (Abbott 2001, Crane 
1972, Kitcher 1990). In co-citation networks, such specialized fields manifest themselves as 
multiple interconnected clusters that can be understood as the outcome of academic 
knowledge production (Adams/Light 2014, Kronegger et al. 2011, Moody 2004, 
Moody/Light 2006). As clusters represent distinct research areas, they contain contributions 
with high topical overlap within clusters and low topical overlap between clusters. With the 
network topology established, we can identify such specialized fields inductively using an 
edge-based clustering algorithm.23 This revealed fifteen clusters of interconnected 
contributions ranging in size from 4 to 86 contributions (Figure 3).  
 
--- Figure 3 here --- 
 
Figure 3 captures the division of the epistemic domain of RCTs into 15 specialist research 
areas that existed or emerged between 1944 and 1970.24 Each node represents one of the 442 
                                                
23 We used a betweenness-based algorithm to identify clusters consisting of nodes with many connections 
within-cluster and few connections between clusters (Newman/Girvan 2004). This algorithm resonates with our 
expectation that distinct research areas consist of publications that exhibit topical overlaps among themselves 
but not with neighboring fields of enquiry. A modularity score of Q =.59 for the partition indicates that the ratio 
of edges observed within-cluster relative to edges observed between-cluster well exceeds that which is to be 
expected by chance. 
24 For example, reducing the minimal number of co-citations from three to two yields a network of 874 
publications and 25 publication clusters of size 4 or greater. Upon closer inspection, however, seven of those 25 
clusters are disconnected from the overall network, leaving only 18 clusters directly connected to the core of the 
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publications in the domain, and its label and coloring denote the cluster it is part of. The 
layout places nodes which share many connections close to each other and thereby highlights 
the topical overlaps among contributions. This layout offers a visual indication of the extent 
to which clusters overlap, with several publications that have been assigned to cluster 07 
(theories of conflict and cooperation) locating towards the top of Figure 3 in the region of 
cluster 03 (cooperative game theory), whereas cluster 10 on the right-hand side of figure 3 is 
almost completely separated from the rest of the network. Each cluster contains classic 
contributions of those fields into which the innovations contained in the TGEB spread. Table 
3 offers a summary overview of each of the fifteen clusters. We have labeled the clusters 
according to the research area that the publications they contain contributed to. We focused 
on those contributions that were most cited within each cluster (cf. the rightmost column).  
 
--- Table 3 here --- 
 
With 86 publications, cluster 01 is the largest cluster. It occupies a central position in the 
overall network. Other clusters emerge from it and it contains groundbreaking contributions 
that would prove seminal for the development of different fields in the second half of the 
20th century. For example, it contains elaborations on von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
axiomatic representation of the expected utility principle, including Leonard Savage’s The 
Foundations of Statistics (1972 [1954]), Jacob Marschak’s extension of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s axiom set (Marschak 1950),25 and Israel N. Herstein and John Milnor’s (1953) 
                                                
epistemic domain (compared with 14 of 15 clusters in the analysed network). On the other hand, setting a 
threshold of four co-citations reduces the epistemic domain to 294 publications in 14 clusters (the cluster of 
evolutionary biology is eliminated). Given our purpose of constructing a coherent network representation of the 
epistemic domain, setting the threshold at three therefore balances the goals of cohesiveness (i.e., identifying a 
large connected component) and granularity (i.e., preserving relevant publications and clusters). 
25 To preserve space, we do not list contributions that are only referred to as part of the epistemic domain of 
TGEB in the bibliography of this paper. Such references are indicated by square brackets. A complete list of the 
442 publications that are identified as part of the epistemic domain is available from the authors. 
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axiomatic treatment of expected utility. It also contains early attempts to measure utility in 
economics, such as Milton Friedman and Savage (1948, 1952), William Baumol (1951), Paul 
Samuelson (1952), and Frederick Mosteller and Philip Nogee (1951), and early contributions 
to decision-making under uncertainty (e.g., Hurwicz 1951, Shackle 1949). Cluster 01 also 
contains Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa’s Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical 
Survey (1957), the first accessible introduction and highly influential textbook containing the 
main tools and concepts of game and decision theory that facilitated their spread across the 
behavioral and social sciences (O’Rand 1992: 189). Finally, the cluster contains several 
publications that would prove seminal for new sub-disciplines, including Kenneth Arrow’s 
Social Choice and Individual Values [1951] for the field of social choice theory, and 
Abraham Wald’s monograph on Statistical Decision Functions [1950], which, together with 
David Blackwell and M. Abe Girshick’s Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions [1954], 
established foundations for statistical decision analysis (e.g., Dimand/Dimand 1990).26  
By comparison, clusters 02 to 15 are more consistent in terms of topical overlap and 
focus. For example, cluster 02 contains major contributions to non-cooperative games and 
bargaining theory, most notably the seminal contributions by John Nash (1950, 1950b, 1951, 
1953). Nash’s contribution laid the ground for bargaining theory and for non-cooperative 
game theory to spread into economics by introducing most famously the Nash equilibrium. 
The cluster also contains early work on stochastic learning models by Bush and Mosteller 
(1955) and Shapley [1953], both major contributions to the field of stochastic games, a 
subfield of non-cooperative game and bargaining theory.27 Cluster 03 contains seminal 
contributions to cooperative game theory and coalition formation, including work by Robert 
Aumann (1964), Michael Maschler (1964), Martin Shubik (1959), and Lloyd Shapley 
                                                
26 That cluster ‘01’ contains contributions of evident importance for decision-, game-, and social choice theory, 
suggesting that the cluster poses a residual category that could be analyzed further for sub-structures.   
27 See Leonard (1994, 2010) for a history of Nash’s contribution to game theory. 
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(Shapley 1959, Shapley/Shubik 1966, 1969) on market games. And cluster 08 contains 
contributions that would prove central in establishing mathematical finance and the theory of 
portfolio selection, notably the work of Harry Markowitz (1959), William Sharpe (1963, 
1964), and Francesco Modigliani together with Merton H. Miller (1958, 1961). The 
publications contained in the clusters and the clusters themselves are representative of the 
respective fields into which the tools and concepts contained in the TGEB spread. 
Exemplary for applications of RCTs outside of economics, cluster 04 is dominated by 
Herbert Simon's work on behavioral models of rational choice (Simon 1955, 1956, 1957) and 
artificial intelligence [Simon 1960], and by contributions by Ward Edwards (1953, 1954a, 
1954b, 1954c) laying the grounds for behavioral decision research in psychology. The cluster 
also contains contributions that introduced probability theory, mathematical learning theory, 
and expected utility theory into psychology (Davidson et al. 1957, Siegel 1957). Cluster 09 
contains core contributions to measurement theory (e.g., Ellis 1966, Scott/Suppes 1958, 
Suppes/Zinnes 1963) and optimal statistical decision-making (e.g., DeGroot 1970). And 
cluster 10 contains classics by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), Tversky (1969, 
Edwards/Tversky 1967, Tversky/Russo 1969) and other seminal contributions that 
introduced formal decision theory into mathematical psychology (e.g., 
Becker/DeGroot/Marschak 1964).28  
The clusters we identified and how they map onto distinct specialized research areas lend 
validity to our approach to reconstruct the epistemic domain of the scientific innovation from 
topical overlaps expressed in co-citation networks. While it would be interesting to examine 
in detail the connections among individual publications within each cluster in terms of 
content and the historical context of their production, our aim in this paper is more analytical. 
In the following section, we identify and interpret four roles that contributions can occupy in 
                                                
28 For a historical account of the early years of for example Clyde Coombs’ mathematical psychology program 
and Edwards’ program of behavioral decision research, see Heukelom (2010). 
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the diffusion process on the basis of our network representation of the epistemic domain of 
RCTs, according to which we can classify individual contributions in terms of the function 
they had in the diffusion of RCTs. Thereby, we lay a particular focus on those contributions 
that bridged the gap between the epistemic core and the different clusters, thereby enabling 
their spread across specialized fields. 
Four Roles Identified from Salient Network Positions  
In the preceding sections, we have constructed a network-topological representation of the 
epistemic domain of the TGEB and have distinguished between an epistemic core and a 
periphery of specialized research areas, including disciplines and sub-disciplines. In this 
section, we identify and further characterize four distinct roles that individual contributions 
can occupy in the diffusion of a scientific innovation. We identify those roles from the salient 
positions of contributions in the network. In addition to (1) the innovator, we distinguish 
between (2) elaborators, i.e., contributions that are part of the epistemic core but not 
connected to the periphery, (3) specialists, i.e., contributions that relate (only) to subfields 
located in the peripheral clusters, and (4) translators, i.e., contributions that connect the 
clusters to the epistemic core. Drawing on historical accounts of the spread of the TGEB, we 
argue that what we identify and interpret as translator contributions in particular had a central 
role in facilitating the diffusion of the tools and concepts contained in the TGEB by making 
them accessible to further work in both preexisting and newly emerging research areas.  
 
--- Table 4 here --- 
 
Table 4 summarizes this typology and offers criteria for classifying each contribution in 
the epistemic domain based on its salient position in the network topology. We will discuss 
each of the four roles in turn. First, there is the innovator, which establishes the basis for 
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analysis. Rather than inferring this role from its network position, the innovator contribution 
is identified exogenously by drawing upon some information about the innovation in 
question. In our case, existing histories of RCTs in the social and behavioral sciences (e.g., 
Dimand/Dimand 1995, Giocoli 2003, Leonard 2010, Weintraub 2002) as well as review 
articles (e.g., Hurwicz 1945, Marschak 1946, Simon 1945) have pointed out the highly 
innovative mathematical contributions of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s TGEB, which 
contains important concepts and mathematical tools that would later become identified as 
ingredients of modern RCTs (Anand et al. 2009). 
Second, the role of elaborator is assigned to contributions that are part of the epistemic 
core without being connected to a distinct subfield of enquiry. This role captures the idea that 
after a fundamentally innovative contribution has been made, it often takes time until it has 
been supported by further evidence or until other scholars have been convinced of its 
conceptual, theoretical or empirical usefulness. Elaborators contribute to the innovation’s 
establishment by clarifying, adapting and sometimes thereby extending its conceptual, 
theoretical, or empirical scope. By engaging with the innovation, elaborator contributions 
align the innovation with field-specific theoretical frameworks and methodological standards, 
modify it in ways that its usefulness for solving field-specific problems becomes apparent, or 
offer a commonly shared framework for the innovation to be used in specialist research. 
Analytically, we identify elaborators as publications that are part of the epistemic core, i.e., 
that share a strong topical overlap with other elaborators, but do not connect to a distinct 
research area. 
Third, specialist publications exhibit topical overlap with contributions in their respective 
subfield (i.e., cluster of publications) but are not connected with the epistemic core. As the 
cluster structure of the epistemic domain captures the increasing specialization that is 
characteristic of modern science (Leahey et al. 2008), specialist contributions take on the role 
of working on problems within defined research agendas that tackle highly specialized rather 
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than innovative topics in their respective field. They draw indirectly on the already 
established and modified innovation to address specific problems of interest within a 
particular scientific community. We expect specialist contributions to often be outcomes of 
what Kuhn (1970) has described as normal science. Analytically, we identify specialist 
contributions as being part of a cluster but not connected to the epistemic core. 
While the identification of specialists offers an entry point for studying the cluster-
internal structure of the epistemic domain, we consider the fourth role, the translator 
publications, crucial for examining the conditions under which scientific innovations spread. 
The translator’s role is to establish a connection between the epistemic core and one or more 
clusters of specialist activity in the periphery of the epistemic domain. Translators differ from 
elaborators and specialists in that they have a bridging role in facilitating the spread of a 
scientific innovation from its elaboration in the epistemic core into specialized fields. 
Particularly in the incipient stage of the diffusion process, translators make the scientific 
innovation accessible and applicable to discipline-specific or even new problems that lie 
outside the innovation’s direct domain of applications. They align the scientific innovation 
with more traditional research practices and make its epistemic value apparent for problems 
in their specialized fields. As such, they connect the core to an interrelated subset of 
specialists. Translator contributions modify a scientific innovation in such a way that they 
align with already established frameworks and concepts so that specialist contributions can 
draw on them. Thereby, translators facilitate the adoption of the scientific innovation across 
initially remote or even into new domains of enquiry, introduce it into distinct fields, and 
effectively resolve Kuhn’s essential tension between tradition and novelty.  
These four roles capture two important ideas that we have hinted at already. Scientific 
contributions must balance the essential tension between innovativeness on the one hand, and 
specialization and alignment on the other (see also De Langhe 2014, Uzzi, Mukherjee, 
Stringer, and Jones 2013). Translators balance this tension by drawing on the innovation to 
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make a substantially novel contribution to problems in a specific research area. The authors 
of translator publications are able and willing to adopt the scientific innovation, a non-trivial 
precondition when considering that scientists are trained to use a limited set of established 
methods and concepts that often do not align with the scientific innovation. On the other 
hand, they ensure compatibility of their contribution with the epistemic core, which in turn 
has to inform the research undertaken in the clusters so that the innovation becomes accepted. 
In bridging the gap between the scientific innovation and a specific field of research, 
translators must have the rare characteristic of being novel enough to lay the ground for 
future progress while being sufficiently aligned with the disciplinary culture, accepted 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks, and traditional techniques in specialist fields.  
Analytically, translators broker between the innovation and specialized fields in that they 
are part of the epistemic core but at the same time highly connected to at least one distinct 
cluster of specialist publications. In the following, we report on our analysis. Drawing on the 
taxonomy and respective definitions summarized in Table 3, we identify 15 translator 
publications in our example from our network representation that are listed in Table 5. They 
bridged between the scientific innovation of the TGEB and the sub-disciplines.29  
 
--- Table 5 here --- 
 
                                                
29 To assess the robustness of our findings, we constructed networks while varying both the maximal number of 
years between publications by {4,5,6,7} and the minimal co-citation threshold by {2,3,4,5}, and assigned roles 
to each publication based on their position in the resultant networks. 24 of the 29 publications that we have 
identified as part of the epistemic core are also identified in 13 or more of the 16 networks. For those 180 
publications that appeared in all 16 networks, we then compared role-assignments for each pair of constructed 
networks using the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI). This index ranges symmetrically between -1 and 1, with positive 
values indicating a greater-than-chance correspondence between classifications (Hubert/Arabie 1985). The 
proposed methodology yields outcomes that are reasonably robust to variations in the network construction, 
with an ARI of between 0.55 and 0.69 indicating a high degree of robustness relative to variations in the 
maximal number of years between publications and an ARI of between 0.12 and 0.3 indicating a moderate but 
still greater-than-chance robustness to variations in the co-citation threshold. The latter finding reinforces our 
expectation that increasing the co-citation threshold above three eliminates connections, publications, and 
research fields that were no longer pursued or that are no longer recognized in chronicles written since the early 
1980s (see also footnote 24). Choosing a low threshold mitigates this effect. 
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In the case of the TGEB, eight of the 15 identified translators belong to the epistemic 
core. One cluster, that of non-cooperative game theory, has two translators, both of which 
were authored by Nash (1950, 1951), and both making essentially the same contribution, i.e., 
the Nash equilibrium. Four clusters (03, 07, 12, and 14) are not themselves directly 
connected to the epistemic core. In such cases, we assign that contribution the role of 
translator of a cluster, which has the most connections to contributions that are part of the 
epistemic core. For example, cluster 03 is not connected to the epistemic core directly, but 
Riker (1962) is connected to the epistemic core via Luce and Raiffa’s classic textbook, and is 
therefore identified as the translator that made RCTs fruitful for political science. For cluster 
07, Schelling (1960) is not in the epistemic core either, but is also connected to Luce and 
Raiffa (1957), to Simon (1955), and to Pratt (1964). Schelling (1960) has the strongest 
connection to the epistemic core and is therefore also identified as translator. By this logic, 
13 of the 15 previously identified clusters have one translator (see Table 5). In the following 
section, we interpret and discuss how the translators facilitated the spread of RCTs across the 
social and behavioral sciences.  
8. The Diffusion of Rational Choice Theories in Historical Context 
In the previous sections, we have presented a novel approach to identifying the epistemic 
domain of the TGEB as an indicator for the diffusion process of RCTs and the tools and 
concepts they were grounded upon. We have identified four salient roles that 
contributions may have in fostering the diffusion process. With this role typology, we can 
identify elaborator, specialist, and translator publications on the basis of their network 
positions. We have claimed that translator publications have a particularly important role 
in that they link contributions that elaborated upon the TGEB with specialized research 
areas into which RCTs spread. In this section, we examine the role of translator 
publications in the diffusion of the tools and concepts contained in the TGEB 
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in more detail and relate our rule-based analysis of bibliometric data back to historical 
accounts of the social context within which RCTs began to diffuse.   
It is generally recognized that the TGEB had an important part in introducing RCTs into 
the social and behavioral sciences during the early Cold War era (Isaac 2010). While the 
axiomatic representation of the expected utility principle and the concept of a two-person 
zero-sum game did not readily match conceptually and methodologically with the traditional 
utility theory that was predominant at the time (ibid.), they inspired new measurement and 
data generation techniques, influenced theory-building, motivated the formulation of new 
formal-mathematical theories of decision-making, and legitimized applications of probability 
theory, the axiomatic method, and advanced statistical methods in the social and behavioral 
sciences, among many other issues (Erickson et al. 2013, esp. ch. 4). But before the 
mathematical tools and concepts contained in the TGEB could transcend intellectual and 
disciplinary boundaries and be adopted widely, they first had to enter the conceptual toolbox 
of the scientists. As their application required a substantially new skill set, they could 
transcend existing disciplinary and intellectual boundaries only by way of being translated. 
Translator contributions played a significant role in this process.   
Existing accounts of the history of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s contribution in the 
TGEB suggest that the spread of tools and concepts contained in it was enabled by 
contributions made by a small group of scholars who adopted them from early on and 
elaborated upon them in such a way that they became subsequently applicable to field-
specific or new problems. Most of those scholars were considered pioneers and innovators in 
their field. Their work was interdisciplinary in that they bridged the gap between the highly 
mathematical contribution primarily von Neumann had made in the TGEB and more 
traditional theoretical frameworks used and problems tackled in specific areas. Scholars such 
as Herbert Simon, Kenneth Arrow, John Nash, Harry Markowitz, and Ward Edwards - whose 
contributions we identified as part of the epistemic core - were young and highly promising 
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and had training in mathematics, mathematical statistics, probability theory, and/or later on in 
formal decision theory. At the same time, they were less concerned about disciplinary 
boundaries and more with innovative ways to address problems they considered important 
and pressing in their research area. Leonard Savage, not yet in his 40s, was an example: In 
formulating subjective expected utility theory, he fused the axiomatic theory of preferences 
of von Neumann and Morgenstern with the theory of subjective probability in the tradition of 
Frank Ramsey and Bruno De Finetti to arrive at a decision theory in risky situations (e.g., 
Giocoli 2003: 320, Kadane/Larkey 1982: 114). Subjective expected utility theory has been 
the most influential RCT in economics, statistics, and psychology (Giocoli 2003: 346, 
Heukelom 2010), as it enabled important applications in various subfields of economics, by 
serving as a basis for decision and game theoretic models, and by laying the foundations for 
modern Bayesian statistics and econometrics.30 
While we cannot discuss the historical narrative in detail here, take Ward Edwards as an 
example. Edwards became “the father of behavioral decision making” in psychology 
(Weiss/Weiss 2009). In 1952, he finished his PhD thesis at Harvard, where Frederick 
Mosteller had introduced him to the TGEB. The outcome of his dissertation work was at least 
two core publications that laid the grounds for behavioral decision research in psychology 
(Edwards 1954, 1961). Edwards showed that people have different preferences for 
probabilities in choices under uncertainty and furthermore that subjective modifications had 
to be made to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s objective probability scales (Shanteau et al. 
1999, 408). Published in psychology journals and thus with psychologists as a target 
audience, those contributions offered an extensive survey of the research in economics on 
decision making under certainty and risk, including ordinal and cardinal utility theory and 
indifference curve analysis, and von Neumann and Morgenstern’s contribution. In those 
                                                
30 For a historical overview, see Savage (1972 [1954]: 91 ff.). For a historical explanation of the success of 
Savage’s subjective expected utility theory in economics, see Giocoli (2003). 
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publications, Edwards elaborated on how economic theories of decision making could 
connect to psychological theories as well as existing empirical research and where topical as 
well as conceptual overlaps between the two areas existed (e.g., Edwards 1954). Apart from 
expected utility theory, Edwards would eventually establish Bayesian statistics and Savage’s 
1954 contribution in psychology, which in turn was heavily influenced by the TGEB. 
Besides the fact that the TGEB was taken up by these highly innovative and 
mathematically skilled scholars, another important observation stressed in historical 
narratives is that intense and cross-disciplinary collaborations between this rather small group 
were crucial in fostering this kind of novel research.31 Regular meetings in research seminars, 
summer workshops, and informal sabbaticals at institutions including the RAND Corporation 
and the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University 
(hereafter CASBS) led to the formation of closely-knit networks of those scholars exchanging 
ideas on how to work with the new tools and concepts (e.g., Düppe/Weintraub 2014a, Isaac 
2010, Backhouse/Backhouse 2010: 11, Erickson 2010, O’Rand 1992). This close interaction 
between many early adopters of the TGEB is reflected in our analysis. While a co-citation 
analysis does not capture the social interaction structure of scientists and thus does not allow 
for inferences about the personal social networks of scientists, co-citation networks, at least 
in part, result from social network phenomena involving scientists (Mali et al. 2012: 214). 
As an example, consider the early adoption of the TGEB in economics. The community of 
mathematical economists was still rather small in the late 1940s. Their work was not yet 
widely established, but they were among the first to adopt topology, the axiomatic method, 
and set theory to theorize about decision-making under risk and uncertainty. Many of the 
scholars that were part of this community, including Kenneth Arrow, Leonid Hurwicz, 
                                                
31 The term “cross-disciplinary research” is often used interchangeably with interdisciplinary or 
multidisciplinary collaboration and refers to the collaboration that involves the integration of knowledge from 
two or more disciplines (Klenk et al. 2010: 933). 
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Tjalling Koopmans, Herbert Simon, Gérard Debreu, and Harry Markowitz, were directly or 
indirectly affiliated with RAND, the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, and the 
CASBS (e.g., Debreu 1983, Erickson et al. 2013). Their collaboration was arguably fostered 
by the institutional setup of short information channels, informal meetings, regular seminars 
and workshops with internal and external speakers, and a vivid feedback culture at Cowles 
and the CASBS (ibid.). Those kinds of hybrid research environments between a social science 
lab and a university (Düppe/Weintraub 2014a) allowed scholars to engage more naturally 
with highly innovative concepts such as the two-person, zero-sum game and the axiomatic 
representation of the expected utility principle. The key contributions made by these authors 
are identified as translators (cf. Table 5). They engaged with new mathematical tools and 
concepts largely collaboratively in those specific research environments. By modifying and 
subsequently applying the concepts they could find in the TGEB, their work published in the 
1950s and 1960s turned into seminal contributions, translating the TGEB for decision theory, 
social choice theory, mathematical psychology and organizational theory, general 
equilibrium analysis, mathematical finance, activity analysis, measurement theory, and linear 
programming, among others. Placing the results of our analysis into the social context at the 
time partly explains how those translator contributions could be made and allows us to better 
understand under which conditions scientific innovations become adopted. 
Some scholars also made seminal contributions that gave to a field a conceptual or 
methodological turn or even proved foundational for entirely new fields. For example, 
Herbert Simon’s contributions initiated major research programs in organization theory, 
business administration, and artificial intelligence and led to his core concept of ‘bounded 
rationality’. William F. Sharpe’s work proved foundational for mathematical finance, and 
Richard E. Bellman’s Dynamic Programming offered what would become a classic in the 
field, containing his mathematical theory of multistage decision processes as well as an 
introduction to mathematical methods and core concepts of mathematical economics and 
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game theory. While these scholars made first steps towards adopting the innovative tools, 
they at the same time also remained representatives of their own fields, aligning their 
research with discipline-specific questions and roughly following discipline-specific 
conventions (Erickson et al. 2013: 12). As such, the positions of these authors’ contributions 
within our network show that their role in the spread of RCTs is best understood as bridging 
a gap between authors elaborating on, and partly translating, the scientific innovation and 
specialists applying it to problems of their concern. By fulfilling this bridging function, 
translators contributed to the spread of the innovative ideas contained in the TGEB towards 
their modification and their application within and across old and new fields in the behavioral 
and social sciences.32  
As they produce novel research while at the same time establishing compatibility with 
previous research, we suggest that authors of translator contributions can be understood in 
terms of what Collins and Evans (2007) have called ‘interactional experts’. Interactional 
experts have acquired the ability—by engaging with experts of a particular area of 
expertise—to converse in a language that extends beyond the accustomed conceptual, 
methodical, and/or theoretical skill set of their research area. They are thereby able to engage 
with other specialized fields without themselves being part of that field. In our case, scholars 
such as Simon, Nash, Savage, Arrow, Debreu, and Markowitz were well-versed in 
mathematical logic, mathematical statistics, mathematical psychology, and economics 
without working themselves in mathematics, mathematical statistics, or mathematical 
economics respectively. Arguably, this enabled them to adopt a scientific innovation that had 
primarily been mathematical in nature and then translate it so that it could be taken up and 
used by others. They could occupy a bridging role between their own specialized field and 
                                                
32 We can only pick out some examples to illustrate the match between our findings and existing historical 
narratives. A substantial support of the results of our analysis with existing historical narratives or even 
historical research exceeds the scope of this paper. 
  36 
other elaborators, which was demonstrated by the fact that subsequent publications would 
take up their contributions. 
While a detailed discussion of the historical context remains to be undertaken in a 
different paper, we suggest that the concept of an ‘interactional expert’ could in combination 
with our role typology motivate further research that examines the social interaction among, 
and disciplinary backgrounds of, the authors of each type of contribution. It allows for 
making an inference from those publications to their authors. In our example, two innovative 
concepts—the axiomatic representation of the expected utility principle and the minimax 
theorem—together with a set of mathematical tools and concepts not used previously in the 
social and behavioral sciences first had to be comprehended, elaborated upon, and translated 
in such a way that they would become epistemically useful for a wide range of specialized 
research areas. This process was largely enabled by the translator contributions written by 
mathematically-skilled social or behavioral scientists, who with their work bridged the gap 
between elaborator and specialist contributions and thereby integrated the scientific 
innovation into normal science practice.  
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have addressed the question of how scientific innovations diffuse within 
and across scientific communities. We have introduced a novel diffusion measure based upon 
a co-citation network analysis and, using it, have traced the early spread of RCTs in the 
second half of the 20th century as an exemplary case. By applying our framework, we have 
investigated how the innovative mathematical tools and concepts as well as the two accounts 
of rational behavior contained in John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior led to the spread of axiomatic RCTs within and beyond the 
behavioral and social sciences. We have shown that translator publications facilitated the 
diffusion of new ideas by modifying a scientific innovation in ways that bridge the gap 
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between the epistemic core of the innovation and specialized fields. As authors of translator 
publications must have the ability to communicate across fields, they can be understood as 
‘interactional experts’ who allow for the innovation to enter pre-existing research areas and 
lay the grounds for new ones.  
While illuminating the example of the diffusion of RCTs, our framework allows for some 
general conclusions about the roles that scientific contributions occupy in the diffusion of 
scientific innovations and as such about one instance of how knowledge becomes transferred 
across distinct contexts. Our approach and role typology can be applied to other 
representative cases for knowledge diffusion to identify and classify key contributions that 
modify a scientific innovation by way of their salient positions in the network. Furthermore, 
our analysis has methodological implications for the study of scientific innovation in 
particular and for the production of knowledge more generally. We see the usefulness of 
empirical network analysis for studying knowledge diffusion in science in the extent to which 
it allows to examine historical cases in systematic ways. The increasing availability of 
bibliometric data makes empirical network analysis a promising method to address questions 
about knowledge transfer in general.  
Furthermore, systematic empirical studies such as ours complement detailed studies 
undertaken by historians and philosophers of science and thereby establish connections 
between historical research and more systematic analyses. While historical accounts, for 
instance of RCTs, can examine details of the social, political, cultural, and institutional 
context, elaborate extensively on professional biographies of the scientists, and trace the 
nature and intensity of personal relationships between scholars, such research may be 
constrained by confirmation biases, the limited availability of historical sources, and the 
specific focus a historian takes. A quantitative-empirical analysis - where appropriate - can 
complement detailed historical research, offer a broad and temporal perspective on diffusion 
processes, systematically identify all relevant actors or contributions according to a plausible 
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set of rules, and mitigate potential biases originating in personal interest or a one-sided 
research emphasis.  
The proposed framework offers a bird’s-eye view of the spread of scientific innovations 
that complements more detailed historical studies. As such, it stands to be further 
substantiated by detailed historical studies of actual modification processes, of the conceptual 
and methodological implications that the scientific innovation in question has had for 
particular fields of inquiry, and of the human actors and the institutions they are a part of. 
With the overarching epistemic domain of the scientific innovation established, local sites of 
the diffusion can be reconstructed and interpreted against the backdrop of a historical context 
that is only partially amenable to applications of algorithmically and/or rule-based methods. 
For example, as a set of interrelating scholarly contributions, the epistemic domain of the 
TGEB offers ample opportunity for enriched reconstructions of reasons for an observed 
topical overlap or lack thereof. Each of the contributions that form part of the epistemic 
domain was made by particular authors who were working in specific institutional contexts 
and at particular times. Further research could zoom into the links between individual 
contributions, their authors and the multifaceted contexts within which they produced their 
work, focus more closely on one or more clusters, or study the interconnectedness of clusters.  
By combining historical narrative and empirical network analysis, our case demonstrates 
how methods of network analysis can integrate and inform history and philosophy of science. 
By bringing more nuanced perspectives on the idiosyncrasies of particular diffusion settings, 
further research stands to identify points of similarity and divergence with the rule-based 
account that we have laid out in this paper and can thereby provoke fresh perspectives on the 
processes in question. In the belief that an overall account of the diffusion of particular 
scientific innovations is best rendered at the intersection between quantitative methods and 
qualitative accounts, further historical studies could examine the plausibility of the 
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connections that emerge when applying our rule-based method to bibliometric data that has 
been collected many years after the fact.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Constructing the network topology of the epistemic domain of the TGEB: Panel (a) shows all 
936 contributions that are cited at least three times in 4,905 present-day publications that also cite the 
TGEB, the enlarged, darker node at the center of the network. Every node is connected to the TGEB. (b) 
depicts the network after removing the TGEB and isolate nodes (N=535). The updated layout of the 
same network in (c) reveals a dense clustering of co-citations in present-day publications. Eliminating all 
edges between publications that lie more than 5 years apart yields (d), the network topology (N=442). 
The layouts of (a), (c) and (d) are defined by the same algorithm (Fruchterman/Reingold 1991). 
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Figure 3: Clustering of the epistemic domain into which RCTs finally diffused. 
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Tables 
 
 
Fields of academic enquiry 
 
• General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
• Operations Research, Linear Programming, Activity Analysis  
• Behavioral Decision Research 
• Decision 
 
• Public Choice Theory 
•  
 
Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics  
• Formal decision Theory  
• Mathematical statistics, statistical decision theory, Bayesianism  
• Artificial intelligence research  
• Cooperative / non-cooperative game theory, bargaining theory, theories of conflict  
• Mathematical psychology   
• Measurement theory  
• Theories of organization  
• Mathematical finance, portfolio selection theory  
• Evolutionary biology  
• Microeconomics, information theory, industrial organization  
• Philosophy, logic, computer science  
• Mechanism design theory 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Fields in the behavioral and social sciences that were influenced by the TGEB around 1970. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Data collected from 4,905 publications that cite TGEB according to Scopus; grouped by period 
and type of source. Numbers in parentheses denote average references for each source type and period.  
 
  
Period Articles Conference Papers 
Book 
Chapters Total 
     [1980,1995] 15 (46.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 15 (46.0) 
(1995,2000] 544 (44.0) 15 (32.3) 0 (0.0) 559 (38.0) 
(2000,2005] 726 (44.9) 231 (26.2) 14 (39.2) 971 (36.1) 
(2005,2010] 1,234 (49.3) 491 (26.1) 95 (52.8) 1,820 (38.5) 
(2010,2014] 1,158 (58.8) 324 (25.5) 58 (56.3) 1,540 (43.4) 
     Total 3,677 (50.6) 1,061 (26.0) 167 (52.9) 4,905 (39.5) 
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Table 3: Fifteen clusters of contributions representing distinct fields into which the conceptual 
innovations contained in the TGEB spread between 1944 and 1970. 
 
  
ID Research areas Size citations     av. (s.d.) 
year  
av. (s.d.) Most cited within cluster  
      
01 Theories of decision-making, 
broadly cited classics 
86 32.3 
(74.78) 
1953.0 
(3.7) 
Savage54, Allais53, Luce57, 
Markowitz52, Arrow51c 
02 Non-cooperative game theory, 
bargaining theory, cybernetics 
47 29.4 
(61.23) 
1951.8 
(3.1) 
Nash51, Nash50, Nash50b, Nash53, 
Shapley54 
03 Cooperative game theory, 
coalition formation 
36 15.4 
(13.07) 
1964.0 
(3.3) 
Schmeidler69, Riker62, Banzhaf65, 
Shapley67, Davis65 
04 Behavioral models of decision-
making, math. psychology 
27 22.3 
(31.80) 
1956.6 
(3.8) 
Simon55, Simon57, Edwards54b, 
Simon56b, March58 
05 Stochastic decision theory, 
foundations of decision theory 
18 28.1 
(59.68) 
1960.9 
(2.7) 
Ellsberg61, Cyert63, Simon59, 
Friedman66, Strotz56 
06 Linear programming, incompl. 
information, Bayesianism 
10 24.6 
(24.94) 
1965.2 
(3.0) 
Harsanyi67, Selten65, Akerlof70, 
Lewis69, Lemke64 
07 Theories of conflict and 
cooperation 
18 21.9 
(23.24) 
1962.9 
(3.9) 
Schelling60, Hardin68, Gillies59, 
Aumann59, Rapoport65 
08 Mathematical finance, portfolio 
selection, asset pricing 
42 17.1 
(21.49) 
1965.3 
(3.8) 
Markowitz59, Rothschild70, Sharpe64, 
Hadar69, Hanoch69 
09 Statistical decision theory, 
measurement theory 
57 22.5 
(34.98) 
1966.1 
(3.0) 
Pratt64a, Fishburn70c, Raiffa68, 
Anscombe63, Arrow65 
10 Behavioral decision science 14 18.1 
(20.14) 
1967.6 
(2.1) 
Luce69, Tversky69, Slovic68, 
Becker64, Lancaster66 
11 Linear programming,   
operations research 
7 34.7 
(54.90) 
1958.6 
(3.2) 
Shapley53b, Bellman57a, Howard60, 
Pontryagin62, Bellman62 
12 Applied statistical decision 
theory 
6 11.7 
(10.76) 
1963.5 
(3.0) 
Raiffa61a, Howard66a, Edwards63a, 
Schlaifer59, Phillips66a 
13 Economic theory of value 5 15.8 
(17.28) 
1959.6 
(2.9) 
Debreu59, Debreu60a, Kraft59, 
Scott64, Patinkin56 
14 Evolutionary biology 5 10.6 
(12.60) 
1965.4 
(2.4) 
Hamilton64, Williams66, Hamilton67, 
WynnEdwards62, Lee68 
15 General equilibrium analysis 4 11.5 
(13.18) 
1957.0 
(2.2) 
Arrow54, Koopmans57a, Arrow58a, 
McKenzie59 
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Cluster Translator publication Times Cited 
   01 Savage, L.J., (1954): The Foundations of Statistics, New York: John Wiley and 
Sons 
542 
02 Nash, J.F. (1950): Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, PNAS, 36, 48-49 274 
02 Nash, J. (1951): Non-cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286-295 295 
03 Riker, W.H. (1962): The Theory of Political Coalitions, New Haven: Yale 
University Press 
46 
04 Simon, H.A. (1957): Models of Man. Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on 
Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting, Chapman & Hall Ltd., London 
79 
05 Ellsberg, D. (1961): Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 75, 643-669 
265 
06 Harsanyi, J.C. (1967): Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian 
Players (I, II and III), Management Science, 14, 159-182, 320-334, 486-502 
90 
07 Schelling, T.C. (1960): The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press 93 
08 Sharpe, W.F. (1964): Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under 
Conditions of Risk, Journal of Finance, 19, 425-442 
64 
09 Pratt, J.W. (1964): Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, Econometrica, 32 
(1-2), 122-136 
190 
10 Becker, G.M., Degroot, M.H., Marschak, J. (1964): Measuring Utility by a Single-
response Sequential Method, Behavioural Science, 9 (3), 226-232 
20 
11 Bellman, R. (1957): Dynamic Programming, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univerity 
Press 
46 
12 Raiffa, H., Schlaifer, R. (1961): Applied Statistical Decision Theory, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press  
32 
13 Debreu, G. (1959): Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic 
Equilibrium, New York: Wiley 
46 
15 Arrow, K.J., Debreu, G. (1954): Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive 
Economy, Econometrica, 22, 265-290 
31 
   
 
Table 5: Translator publications identified from their positions in the co-citation network. 
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